It is not uncommon that publicly employed physicians also have income from work outside the hospital, often termed moonlighting. There is little empirical evidence of such activity. In this paper we investigate which factors that may influence physicians' choice of work between the public hospital sector and elsewhere. An exceptionally high wage increase in 1996 for one group of hospital physicians (assistant physicians) serves as a natural experiment, and we analyse whether wages in general and this reform in particular have affected physicians' external earnings. For assistant physicians we find that higher wages at public hospitals affect negatively both the decisions to earn income externally, and level of income once active. For consultant physicians, on the other hand, there was no such response to the wage increase. Several hospital specific factors representing job specific work characteristics also matter for physicians' decisions to moonlight. JEL classification code: I11, J22, J23, J44.
Introduction
In predominantly public health care systems as in the Scandinavian countries and in the UK, it is considered a potential problem that physicians take up jobs and earn income from external sources. In addition to a main employment contract with a public hospital, it is not uncommon that physicians earn considerable additional income from work outside the hospital. Such activity is often termed moonlighting.
This constitutes a problem if it effects hospital production negatively due to lack of key personnel, or if it implies giving access to treatment for diagnoses or patients of low priority. Countries with a National Health Care System often suffer from unacceptably long waiting lists, often claimed to be related to lack of key health personnel. Thus, for the public health care institutions, on the margin moonlighting may affect their cost efficiency as well as objectives concerning treatment levels and prioritisation among patient groups. So as to attract physicians to the public hospitals and induce them to supply additional effort at these institutions rather than to external activities, wage policy and manning restrictions to control workload are integral parts of a public health care policy. In this paper we will analyse how wage settlements and measures for workload affect physicians' decisions to earn income from other sources than a public hospital which is their main employer. The institutional framework is the Norwegian national health care system, where wage policies and wage bargaining between the physicians' union and hospital owners seem to have been used actively for affecting allocation of resources among different health care producers.
Based on available statistics (OECD 2005) , the density of physicians and nurses in Norway is at or above average OECD level. Unacceptable waiting lists in the public health care sector and alleged shortage of key health personnel may indicate that health care personnel are inefficiently used. A specific problem may be that physicians work too short hours for their main employer. Thus, during the 1990ies a growing concern emerged that physicians devoted to much time to work outside the hospitals. However, hospital employment increased during this period.
Some evidence has been provided indicating that this increase in number of physicians has contributed little to increasing number of patients treated (Bratlid 2000) . A lower than expected level of patient treatment may be due to extra work outside the hospital, using physician resources that could otherwise have been used at public hospitals.
We investigate which factors determine physicians' decision to moonlight and earn income as self-employed outside the hospital 1 . When physicians have additional employment beyond ordinary hospital work, the reason may be found in good income prospects through alternative employment, for example due to a large demand for services in the private and independent part of the health care sector. Alternatively, it may result from problematic working conditions at the hospitals. There is a cost to the public hospitals when physicians devote their efforts to supplementary employment, since this labour could alternatively be used working for the main employer, either by being more productive during normal working hours, or by working overtime. Wage policy is one of the instruments used by the government to attract key health personnel, and in particular to induce physicians to allocate additional work effort to hospitals.
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To mitigate a trend among publicly employed physicians to work outside the hospitals, and induce more work at the hospitals, a substantial wage increase was granted in 1996. The wage settlement was particularly favourable for assistant 1 Another source of external income is from part-time positions. Unfortunately, we have no information on part-time work outside the hospital in our data set. 2 Planned overtime work is in general not legal. However, physicians are exempted from this regulation, and can plan for considerable overtime work.
physicians, but also consultant physicians got a large increase in wages. Higher wages might in isolation contribute to reduced demand for physicians. Two factors work in the opposite direction. Firstly, the health personnel labour market was probably out of equilibrium in the sense of being supplier rationed for physicians as well as nurses.
Secondly, the following year (1997), in order to induce higher activities within the public hospitals, the government decided to introduce an activity based finance system, expectedly increasing demand for physicians at any given wage level. During the three years preceding this wage increase, wages were rather stable, although wage rates may have varied differently among groups of physicians.
The wage settlement in 1996 creates a natural experiment enabling us to see whether wages in general affect the decisions to moonlight, and the level of moonlighting once participating. Since the wage increase was much higher for assistant physicians than for consulting physicians we also focus on possible differences in moonlighting activity between the two groups. Our data cover the period 1993-1997, that is, three years before and two years after the wage settlement.
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The data also include information about relevant working conditions like capacity utilisation, health care personnel per patient and type of hospital, considered equally important for choice of work effort at the hospitals. We have information about individual specific observable characteristics, like age and family situation, which according to standard labour market theory are held to be important for labour supply.
Use of panel data enables us in addition to control for unobservable individual characteristics, as well as time variant selection into moonlighting.
There are relatively few studies investigating labour supply of physicians.
Relevant papers include Rizzo and Blumenthal (1994) and Showalter and Thurston 3 Wage settlement was in effect as of May 1996. Wage rates are observed in October each year.
(1997) on US data, and Baltagi, Bratberg and Holmås (2003) and Saether (2003) using Norwegian data. The Norwegian studies find positive wage elasticities for employee physicians. The US studies also estimate positive elasticities for physicians working as self-employed but with less clear results for employee physicians. Moonlighting in general has attracted interest in the literature but there are very few papers that address this phenomenon in the health care sector. Biglaiser and Ma (2003) show that moonlighting may be welfare improving, while Iversen (1997) and Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2002) are other relevant papers investigating welfare effects of interactions between public and private sectors. A paper that considers relative wage effects both theoretically and empirical is Conway and Kimmel (1998) . They find that moonlighting as an option leads to relatively high wage elasticities.
Thus, this study offers new empirical evidence on physicians' income generating activities beyond their main job at a hospital. The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide an institutional outline and a theoretical background for how wages and job characteristics may effect decisions on working hours of physicians. Data are presented in section 3, and a discussion of our empirical approach is given in section 4. In section 5 results are discussed, while section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
Institutional and theoretical background.
Norway has around 14.000 trained physicians (OECD 2005 Almost 100% of physicians are members of the national physicians' union, which bargains wages and work conditions on behalf of its members. The union also bargains on behalf of private specialists, basically on public refunds for treatment of patients referred to them through the public health care system. Wage rates are bargained every year at a central level, with room for local bargaining as well.
Individual and local adjustments of wages take place through this local wage bargaining. There is also room for some local discretion at county and hospital level in fitting employees into wage brackets. Thus, there will be variation in wage levels across regions and hospitals, as well as over time and between types of physicians.
As previously mentioned, there are indications of some shortage of physicians working in the dominantly public part of the hospital sector. Policy during recent years has been aimed at attracting physicians to work at hospitals, and to induce them to work longer hours at the hospitals. This was one intention of the government side when accepting a generous wage settlement for hospital physicians in 1996. There may, however, be several factors explaining both the shortage of physicians at public hospitals, and problems in extracting sufficient hours of work from them. In addition to wage differentials, unfavourable working conditions at the public hospitals, for example related to stress from too high capacity utilization and burdensome patients, may induce physicians to supply additional hours externally instead of work overtime for the main employer. It is interesting to look at the relative importance of wages and work environment for decisions to moonlight. For hospital owners, the outcome may have policy consequences, in the sense that monetary remuneration and improved working conditions may supplement each other as incentive mechanisms for attracting physicians to specific activities and work places.
We will use a standard utility maximization approach to represent the by a vector Ψ. We then write the utility function of a representative physician as
With w i as the wage rate for job i, the budget constraint is
Assuming that less than a 100% position as well as overtime are possible, the physician chooses number of hours at the hospital, which include contracted hours, l c , and overtime, l o , or external work, l m , so as to maximise (1) given (2). Letting L = Σ i l i , the resultant Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions are
By definition of a main job we assume that always l c > 0, implying equality of bracket in (3), and since we assume that the physician can choose to work less than 100%, Symmetrically, for work characteristics representing a disutility, l i is reduced if conditions are worsened.
Thus, physicians will adjust their labour supply in the hospital and externally according to wage levels and income prospects both places, as well as according to 8 Note that some comparative static results may depend on sign of second order differentials, which may sometimes be hard to determine. However, some simplifying and unproblematic assumptions will enable signing effects unambiguously. 9 We assume
work characteristics like stress or fringe benefits. Changes in wage levels and work conditions will affect the degree to which physicians, on the margin, take up jobs outside of the hospitals. In the empirical section, we will use different estimators to determine the decision to have additional income from sources outside of the hospital (moonlight). Independent variables include hospital wages and proxies for hospital work characteristics, in addition to individual and hospital specific variables. In particular it is of interest to trace effects on out-of-hospital income from a natural experiment in 1996, when hospital wages were increased quite considerably, with an expected fall in participation and income from moonlighting.
Data and variables
Our main data source is a personnel register administered by the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (NALRA), providing individual specific information on wages and working hours of public servants employed by counties and municipalities. Employees of the main bulk of Norwegian hospitals are represented. The NALRA data have been merged with individual as well as hospital specific information from Statistics Norway. All data sources are public registers.
Data on income from self-employment are extracted from tax records. We use a panel data set covering the period 1993 to 1997
During this period, sixty-four hospitals reported to the NALRA register, which constitutes a majority of Norwegian hospitals.
10 However, for three hospitals information on occupancy rate and length of stay was not available, reducing the sample to physicians within 61 hospitals. We further restrict the sample to include only physicians holding a seventy-five percent position or more in a hospital. The final sample then includes 5868 physicians.
( Table 1 about here)
The variables used in the analysis are defined in Table 1 , while in Table 2 ( Table 2 about here) 11 Since the wage settlement came into effect in June/July 1996, and since the adjustment to the wage increase probably take some time, it is not surprising that we don't see any effect in 1996.
Looking at the variables measuring working conditions at the hospitals, we see that the occupancy rate varied between 85 and 88 percent. From 1993 to 1997 there has been an increase in number of physicians per bed from 0.34 to 0.44, and nurses per bed have increased from 1.13 to 1.38. Costs per hospital bed showed a marked increase during 1996 and 1997, potentially caused by the wage increase.
Since the wage settlement in 1996 was particularly generous for assistant physicians, it might be interesting to see whether the moonlighting activity for assistant physicians differ from that of consultant physicians. Tables 3 and 4 ( Tables 3 and 4 about here) . Applying for example OLS only on the observations for physicians who moonlight will lead to biased estimates of the β vector.
Econometric method
To correct for sample selection and unobserved heterogeneity in the external income equation we follow a two-step approach proposed by Kyriazidou (1997) 12 , see also Askildsen, Baltagi and Holmås (2003) for an application on nurses' labour supply. This estimator relies on pairwise differences over time applied to equation (4) for Kyriazidou (1997) suggests the following procedure. In the first step, get consistent estimates of the parameters in the selection equation. Here, we estimate a conditional logit model using only the physicians who change status over time. In the next step we use these estimates to construct weights which finally are included in a weighted least square regression.
The estimator is
where in ψˆ are "kernel" weights, declining to zero as the difference
K is a "kernel density" function, and n h is a sequence of "bandwidths" that tends to zero as ∞ → n .
Empirical results
The following main issues are considered: Firstly, does the wage level at the hospital influence physicians' decisions to moonlight and earn income as self-employed outside of the hospitals? We investigate this question by estimating the effect of variation in hourly hospital wages on external income. An important advantage of our data set and time period is that it includes a generous wage settlement in 1996, providing sufficient exogenous variation in the wage variable both over time and between groups of physicians. Note that the wage settlement was much more generous for assistant physicians than for consultant physicians. We are not only of Table 5 we also report results from OLS and fixed effect regressions 15 . The large differences between the estimates of the OLS and fixed effect models clearly indicates 14 We have experimented with different values of h but this had very little effect on the final estimates. 15 The OLS model gives unbiased estimates only when no sample selection or unobserved heterogeneity exists. The estimates from the fixed effect model are unbiased if the sample selection process is time constant.
the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, and we therefore focus on the results from the fixed effect and the sample selection models.
( Table 5 about have an effect on how much the physicians work outside the hospital, but not on whether they have external income or not. Married physicians earn less from selfemployment than others, while the opposite is the case for physicians having children younger than 3 years of age.
Turning now to our main variables of interest, we observe from the sample selection model that the hourly wage rate has a negative and significant effect on the participation decision and on magnitude of external income from self-employment, but only so for assistant physicians. The descriptive statistics in section 3 indicated that most of the wage effect worked through the participation decision and this seems to be confirmed from these results. In the fixed effect model the coefficient on the interaction "Wage*assistant physician" is 0.4256 while in the two-stage model this coefficient is only 0.0712.
Lastly we look at the effects of job characteristics. The occupancy rate, number of health personnel (nurses and physicians) per bed and costs per bed provide information about work-load at the hospitals. Thus, they are reasonable proxies for job characteristics that increase or decrease job related stress, and thus they represent important work condition variables. More physicians per bed reduce income from non-hospital jobs but do not affect the participation decision. It is reasonable to assume that physician staffing indicates the work load which a given physicians faces on the margin. Thus, more physicians per bed are less stressful and considered a more attractive job characteristic. The quite clear picture of a positive effect from more nurses per bed is perhaps more surprising. It may be the case that nurses to a small degree can substitute for physicians. Another problem in interpreting this variable is that the increase in number of nurses went hand-in-hand with an even larger reduction in number of auxiliary nurses. Thus, during this period more nurses per bed do not necessarily reflect improved working conditions for physicians, since it is unclear how the total effect of the two simultaneous events turned out for nursing services.
The occupancy rate works in the expected direction. There is a positive and significant effect on external wage income, as well as on the participation decision from the selection models. Occupancy is a variable with very clear interpretation in terms of work-load, and it gives as such good support for the simple theoretical and empirical formulation of the model. In hospitals with high costs per bed, physicians are less likely to have income from self-employment, and they will have lower external income once participating.
We interpret the results held together that hospital wages have a clear effect on assistant physician's decision to work as self-employed. However, among consultant physicians we find no indications that hospital wages have affected the moonlighting activity. The physicians' job characteristics are important for their decisions to moonlight and work as self-employed, beyond their full time job at the hospital.
Concluding remarks.
We find a significantly negative effect of wages on assistant physicians' income from self-employment. Thus, wage policy and efforts to affect working conditions are viable instruments for controlling activity in public hospitals.
The wage effect works both trough the decision to moonlight, and wages affect level of activity for those who have income from external sources. Our results indicate that a model that is able to correct for unobserved heterogeneity as well as sample selection is warranted so as to be able to isolate effects from a particular reform, here a generous wage increase taking place one specific year but with longlasting effects. Work conditions at the hospitals are also important for incentives to earn income externally. When work environment gets more stressful, as measured by capacity utilization and number of peers available, physicians tend to earn more externally.
Admittedly, the variables included to proxy for work characteristics may also capture general demand for health care services. Also for physicians in public hospitals, a high demand will affect their job opportunities in private practices. As seen from the physicians' point of view, possible demand effects, and reactions to unpleasant work conditions, will work in the same direction. Whether a high workload and stressful work situation stem from high demand or from bad organization of work, it may induce the physician to allocate additional hours of work outside the public hospital, since a private unit will generally be able on the margin to offer higher payment. For policy, the consequences will be different. If difficult work conditions at the public hospitals result from shortage of physicians, which is again due to high demand for health care services compared to capacity, there seems to be a better argument for alleviating the problem through wage compensation, given that labour is available elsewhere. However, if the tendency for moonlighting has its origin in poor organization, and corresponding stressful working conditions, wage policy may still work, through compensating wage differentials, but a better policy may be to reorganise production conditions and improve internal organization of work. 
